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Abstract
One of the most important policy goals in industrialized countries is to increase the skill
level of the labor force by life-long-learning strategies. In this paper our aim is to explain
to what extent the variation in training investments is determined either by (observed and
unobserved) heterogeneity of firms or of workers, hence we put a new perspective on the
determinants of training. Rather than analyzing single determinants or groups of variables,
we decompose the variation into a worker-specific and a firm-specific part and show how
much of the unexplained variation is independent of both. Our results show that both firm-,
job- and worker-level heterogeneity explains training participation and that firm hetero-
geneity is far less important compared to the others. Also interesting, is the finding that
a large part of the overall variance is not driven by firm- or worker heterogeneity, hence
training participation seems to be to some extent an unexplained event which happens by
chance.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important policy goals in industrialized countries is to increase the skill level of
the labor force by life-long-learning strategies. Studies on the determinants of training give im-
portant insights about firm and worker investments in work-related training because they reveal
which groups in the labor market potentially underinvest in skills (Bassanini et al., 2007). Such
insights are used by policy makers who aim to provide equal opportunities to every worker.1
However, most of these studies use either firm- or worker-level data only, which is a limiting
factor as investments in work-related training are – in contrast to schooling decisions – deter-
mined jointly by firms and workers.
Beyond the importance for policy makers, studies on the determinants of training are a pre-
requisite for the empirical work on returns to training because they uncover possible selection
mechanisms which are relevant for training investments. In a comment on Bassanini et al.
(2007), Pischke (2007) highlights the necessity to consider the selection into training in order to
estimate returns to training appropriately. In this paper, our aim is to explain to what extent the
variation in training investments is determined either by heterogeneity of firms or of workers,
hence we put a new perspective on the determinants of training.
In this study, we do not investigate the importance of single models. We focus rather on both
the explained and the unexplained part of training variation. We decompose the variation into
a worker-specific and a firm-specific part, split both into an observed and unobserved part, and
finally show how much of the variation is independent of both. Thereby, we address especially
the role of job heterogeneity. Moreover, we test whether firm’s and worker’s investments are
substitutes or complements.
In line with former studies we do not only look at overall work-related training participation
but also distinguish between purely firm-sponsored and worker co-sponsored training. Bas-
sanini et al. (2007) finds evidence for differences in the determinants regarding overall or purely
employer-sponsored training. And also Pischke (2001) discusses differences in the determinants
(and also on self-assessed benefits) of training that is initiated by workers or firms and financed
by firms or workers in terms of money or time respectively.2 The motivation for this differen-
tiation goes again back to Pischke (2007) who called for a closer link between the theoretical
and empirical literature on training.
1One example is a German program called WeGebAU which subsidizes training participation of unskilled
workers and employees of small- and medium-sized firms. Recent literature reveals that less skilled workers and
employees in smaller firms are trained less than others (Asplund, 2005).
2He shows with the German Socio-Economic Panel that there is a correlation between worker-sponsored train-
ing (in terms of money and time) and the generalizability of training courses (measured in terms of certificates).
But also the participation in a lot of firm-sponsored training courses is rewarded with a certificate.
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Our results reveal, with regard to firm’s investments, that although the firm-level heterogeneity
seems to be more important in theoretical literature, the worker-level heterogeneity is more pro-
nounced in the real world. The same is true regarding worker co-sponsored investments. More-
over, tasks and occupations are the most important determinants at both levels which highlights
the requirement regarding theoretical considerations to move from the firm-specific perspective
to a more job-specific perspective. Additionally interesting is the finding that a large part of
the overall variance is not driven by firm-, or worker heterogeneity, hence training participation
seems to be to some extent an unexplained event which happens by chance.
Many empirical studies have investigated determinants of work-related training and show that
individual, job-specific, and firm characteristics are important (this literature is summarized by
among others Arulampalam et al., 2004; Bassanini et al., 2007; Asplund, 2005). In her review
on the determinants of and returns to training, Asplund (2005) documents that formal educa-
tion, gender, age, job status, firm size, labor market imperfections like wage compressions and
search frictions, and finally unions are common characteristics that are generally found to be
correlated with firm-provided training. In recent years, several studies confirmed former results
and showed other job characteristics like tasks (Görlitz and Tamm, 2016) or high-performing
workplaces (O’Connell and Byrne, 2012) to be further important aspects of observed hetero-
geneity. In addition, training persistence indicates that undetected worker heterogeneity is an
important driver of training investments. Sousounis and Bladen Hovell (2010) and Bassanini
et al. (2007), for instance, find evidence that previously unexplained training heterogeneity can
be substantially reduced if lagged values of training participation are considered.
Very few studies address the relationship between worker-level determinants and selection into
firms. One reason is that such an approach requires data which cover several firms and several
workers per firm, hence linked employer-employee data is necessary.3 We are aware of only
two studies which use linked-employer-employee data with information about individual par-
ticipation in training in order to show the impact of worker’s selection into firms. Frazis et al.
(2000) is an early example which uses a US matched dataset to analyze firm and worker char-
acteristics correlated with provision of, and participation in training. The authors can mostly
validate results of previous studies using unmatched data and conclude that studies with only
firm characteristics or only worker characteristics do not provide biased results due to omitted
variables. Görlitz and Tamm (2016) use German linked employer-employee data to compare es-
timates of the determinants of training with and without task information and with and without
firm-fixed effects.4 Their results show ambiguous effects of including the firm-fixed effects but
a clear impact of the inclusion of task information on the marginal effects of other worker-level
characteristics.
3Most studies look either at individuals only using household data, at firms using establishment data (sometimes
aggregating individual information) or at the workforce of single firms.
4Görlitz and Tamm (2016) use the German WeLL-Data which is also used here.
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Thus, on the one hand our knowledge about the determinants of training has increased in the
last two decades thanks to improved data with regard to the measurement of training incidence
and intensity, the usage of panel methods, and the quality of observable characteristics. On the
other hand, we still do not know a lot about the drivers of training participation; a huge share
of the variation remains unexplained. Görlitz and Tamm (2016) get a Pseudo R squared of 0.15
for training incidence in the past 12 months in a model with individual and job characteristics
(including tasks) and firm-fixed effects. Grund and Martin (2012) show with the German Socio-
Economic Panel a decreasing goodness of fit over the observation period 1989-2008. With
individual data on the training incidence in the past year they report a McFadden’s Pseudo R
squared which decreases from 0.17 in 1989 to 0.13 in 2008. Their probit estimates include
individual, job status, and firm information (at least firm size and industry).
And finally, an analysis of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) showing that
about half of the total variance explained by their covariates (including individual, job status, oc-
cupation, workplace and firm information) is explained by cross-country differences (Bassanini
et al., 2007). Overall, the Pseudo R squared is 0.20 for overall training incidence. According to
Bassanini et al. (2007), in an estimation which in addition includes a lagged training dummy, the
fraction which is explained by the model increases to 28 per cent. The much better explanatory
power of the model including past training participation suggests that it is extremely important
to take into account not only firm and job characteristics but also (unobservable) individual
heterogeneity.5
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we introduce the data and in section 3 we
describe the empirical methods we apply. In section 4 we show and discuss the empirical results
and in section 5 we conclude with implications for future research and policy making.
2 Data
We use the German linked employer-employee dataset WeLL (Further training as a part of
lifelong learning, see Huber and Schmucker, 2012) which comprises of four waves of a worker
survey conducted between 2007 and 2010. The sample of survey participants was selected in
two steps. First, a random sample of 149 establishments in the manufacturing and service sector
was drawn from those which participated in the IAB Establishment Panel in 2005.6 This sample
is stratified to establishments with 100 to 2,000 employees from three West-German and two
East-German states. Second, an employee sample was randomly drawn from all employees
5While Bassanini et al. (2007) use information about lagged training participation to take into account unob-
served individual heterogeneity, we will make use of worker (and firm) random effects which accomplish a similar
purpose.
6The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual employer survey of approximately 16,000 businesses (see Kölling,
2000).
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who were covered by the social security system and were employed on December 31st 2005 in
one of the 149 establishments.
Survey participants were asked about the number of job-related training courses they had at-
tended since a reference date. Basic information about participation in training is available for
all training courses while detailed information has been collected for up to three most recent
training courses per wave. In addition, the survey includes questions about socio-demographic
characteristics, personality traits and other job-related issues. The survey data is linked to ad-
ministrative records of each employee which include information on wages per day as well as
the duration of employment and to the IAB Establishment Panel (Schmucker et al., 2014).
We limit the analyses to individuals still working in one of the 149 establishments. We also
exclude observations with missing information in relevant variables. In addition, we disregard
all workers who attended more than three training courses as information is not adequately
detailed.7 Finally, we limit the analyses to workers aged 21-64 and exclude apprentices and
workers in partial retirement. We focus on full-time or regular part-time workers and disregard
those with normal working hours of less than 15 hours a week. We are subsequently left with
5,785 workers and 12,560 observations.8
The main variable of interest is the participation in formal training courses. In the first wave, in-
dividuals were asked "Did you participate between January 1st, 2006 and now in any job-related
seminars or training courses?". We further distinguish between firm-financed and worker co-
financed training courses, by identifying whether a worker participated in training exclusively
during his or her working hours or whether training also took place during workers’ leisure
time.9
60% of all training courses took place during working hours only. 20% occurred either partially
or only in leisure time.10 If we take participants into account who did not attend any training
course, we find that 24.4% of workers participate in firm-financed training only, whilst 14.9%
participate in training overlapping into leisure time and 5.3% of workers participate in a given
wave in both forms of training (e.g. attend at least two courses where one is completely in
7This concerns about 4.0% of all workers. Sensitivity analyses regarding participation in any training course
are available upon request.
8The mean number of unique WeLL-participants per establishment is 39 (median 24) with an interquartile
range of 15 to 45.
9We exclude mandatory training such as obligatory first-aid courses, fire safety training and equal opportunities
courses from analysis. This reduces the number of training courses by around 15.1% in the first wave. We also
disregard training courses completed on advice from a third party (ca. 1%). This gives us an average training
participation rate of 44.7% per wave which is comparable to other sources such as the Adult Education Survey
(e.g. Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2012).
10We do not consider a monetary investment by the worker because only 16.2% of all training courses are not
completely paid by the firm and often workers only contribute a small sum. This is also in line with conversations
with practitioners: Firms often pay for training even if this is not directly relevant for the tasks involved in a job
itself, but for which attendance is required at the weekend or in the evening.
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working hours and the other overlaps into leisure time).
As covariates we include individual as well as establishment characteristics with possible rel-
evance for participation in training. We distinguish between establishment, worker and job
attributes. Given that the time period about which workers are retrospectively asked differs be-
tween and within waves (depending on the month of the (last) interview) we add a variable to
each specification which captures the length of the time period in months.
3 Methods
We analyze establishment and worker determinants of participation in training by using multi-
level generalized linear models.11 These models allow us to simultaneously consider firm and
worker heterogeneity in training participation. We combine the advantages of individual level
data (rich information, not only about the individual worker, but also about workers in the same
firm) with attributes of the firms. Hence, we can estimate the relevance of firms’ and workers’
observable and unobservable heterogeneity with regard to training.
As our outcome is binary, we use a random effects logit model. The model gives us an esti-
mate of the total variation in training participation between establishments and between workers
within the same establishment. We use the variance of establishment and worker random effects
to assess the variation attributable to each dimension.12 In our basic model we examine whether
worker i in establishment J(i, t) participates in training at period t:
Pr
[
Training=1it
∣∣αJ(i,t), θi, τt ] = logit−1(αJ(i,t) + θi + τt) (1)
αJ(i,t) and θi are establishment respective worker random effects and T are year dummies.13
We assume that α ∼ N (0, σ2α) and θ ∼ N (0, σ2θ). Furthermore, mutual independence of the
random effects is necessary, i.e. we have to assume that workers do not self-select into certain
firms.14
We first estimate a basicmodel without any control variables other than time effects. We then se-
quentially add establishment characteristicsZ, worker characteristicsX and job characteristics
11Other terms are for example mixed or two-way random effects models. For a textbook introduction see Gelman
and Hill (2007)
12Establishment random effects are identified by observing multiple workers per establishment (within and
across waves), whilst it is the panel structure of the data which enables us to identify worker random effects.
13We approximate the log-likelihood, which has no closed form solution, by Gauss-Hermite quadrature (see
StataCorp, 2013).
14This excludes for example job mobility related to the idiosyncratic training provision of an establishment.
Results of a further specification using establishment fixed effects are available upon request.
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W (in diverse combinations) to investigate how well these levels explain inter- and intra-firm
variation in training.15 The full model is described as follows:
Pr
[
Training=1it
∣∣αJ(i,t), θi, τt, Xit, ZJ(i,t),t, WJ(i,t),t ] =
= logit−1
(
αJ(i,t) + θi + τt +Xitβ +ZJ(i,t),t δ +WJ(i,t),t γ
) (2)
To investigate the importance of establishments and workers with regard to training, we use
a variance decomposition approach. The variance decomposition for mixed models without
random coefficient is easily derived as the covariance in participation in training between two
workers of the same establishment is Cov
(
Traini1t , Traini2t
)
= σ2α. We are therefore able to
partition the total variance σ2 = σ2α+σ
2
θ +
Π2
3
into the three variance terms - the variance of the
establishment random effects σ2α, the variance of the worker random effects σ
2
θ and the variance
of the latent error which is assumed to be equal to the variance of the logistic distribution Π
2
3
.16
This gives us an estimate of the relevance of inter-establishment training differences compared
to heterogeneity of participation in training between workers of the same establishment over
time (this measure is usually called the intra-class correlation). Equation (3) shows a measure
of the overall or unconditional relevance of establishments for workers’ participation in training,
whilst equation (4) shows the relevance of establishments after controlling for establishment,
worker and job characteristics:
σ2α1
σ2α1 + σ
2
θ1 +
Π2
3
(3)
σ2α5
σ2α5 + σ
2
θ5 +
Π2
3
(4)
In order to investigate the role of unobserved firm and worker heterogeneity, we look at the
variance of worker and firm random effects before and after adding observable information.
The reduction of the variance of the random effects in the full model compared to the basic
model gives an estimate of the relevance of observable vs. unobservable heterogeneity.17
Finally, we investigate the relationship of firm- and worker-financed training. Workers might
participate in both firm- and worker co-financed training, or indeed, in neither of them. We ana-
lyze whether establishments which provide a great deal of training are also those in which many
workers participate in co-financed training. We hereby run the specifications from equation (1)
and equation (2) for participating in training entirely during working hours and for training
15As all workers of the same establishment share the same establishment attributes, establishment characteristics
Z can only explain the variation between establishments and not between workers within the same firm.
16This is a standard assumption in the literature, see for example Hox (2010). In the next section we show results
using a linear approximation as suggested in Goldstein et al. (2002).
17We abstract here from the complication that observable heterogeneity is time-varying while random effects
are, by definition, constant over time.
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which overlaps into workers’ leisure time. We then correlate the establishment random effects
Corr
(
α
(1)
firm financed, α
(1)
worker co-financed
)
in order to shed light on the relationship between aggregated
firm- and worker co-financed training rates in a first step.
4 Results
4.1 Decomposition
We first compare the intra-class correlation for establishments and workers by looking at the
relative importance of firms (inter-firm correlation), and workers (correlation of workers within
the same establishment) within the overall variance in participation in training. Table 1 shows
the intra-class correlation of establishments and workers for all job-related training courses.
Our estimate of the unconditional intra-establishment correlation (basic model) attributes 12%
of the total variation in participation in training to differences between establishments (across-
firm heterogeneity). The importance of workers is more than twice that size (28%) (within-firm
heterogeneity), while according to the latent-response formulation, most of the variance is not
attributed to firm or worker heterogeneity (slightly above 60%). According to a likelihood-ratio
test, both establishment and worker random effects are highly significant.
Table 1: Intra-class Correlation (job-related training in general)
Level Basic Model Firm Char. Worker Char. Firm+Worker + Job Char.
Establishment 11.9% 6.4% 9.5% 5.6% 1.4%
Worker 27.6% 29.4% 25.7% 26.9% 19.3%
Latent Error 60.5% 65.6% 65.0% 69.0% 79.6%
Note: This table shows the estimated intra-class correlation for different specifications of a multilevel logit
model for participation in job-related training courses (full estimation output is found in table 3 in the Ap-
pendix). Standard errors are clustered on the establishment level. Establishment and worker random effects are
statistically significant in all specifications according to a likelihood-ratio test.
Next, we compare intra-class correlation of the basic models with other specifications. A com-
parison of the first column (basic model) and the last column (full model with establishment,
worker and job characteristics) in the first row of table 1 indicates that almost 90% of the
across-establishment correlation can be explained by observables. The comparison of the basic
model with other specifications (columns 2-4) shows that the variation in average training rates
between establishments is reduced mostly by establishment and job characteristics, and to a
lesser extent by worker characteristics. This indicates that establishment-variation, in terms of
workers’ participation in training courses, can primarily be explained by firm-level or job-level
differences, but to a smaller extent by the composition of the workforce itself.18
18In our final specification, including establishment, worker and job characteristics, the intra-establishment cor-
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Now, we look at training differences between workers within the same establishment (second
row of table 1). Here, we can only explain 30% of the variance in worker random effects by
including a large set of observables (1 − 19.3/27.6 = 0.30). This is, in stark contrast to the
previous results for the establishment level, where little unexplained heterogeneity remained.19
For the explanation of training incidence differences between workers, we find that job char-
acteristics are more powerful predictors than worker characteristics (establishment characteris-
tics cannot explain training heterogeneity of workers within an establishment by construction).
Note, however, that the set of observed job characteristics is also larger than the set of observed
worker characteristics (36 vs. 10).
The variance decomposition of training, which is either fully financed by the firm or at least
partially financed by the worker, delivers very similar results.20 Again, we find that the worker
dimension is more important than the establishment dimension, and we can explain a much
larger share of the variance on the establishment level with reference to observables than we
can on the worker level. Most interesting, perhaps, is the finding that co-financed training
exhibits a larger share of worker level variance compared to training which is purely financed
by the firm. The share of the establishment level, is ≈11%, being similar across all types of
training.
Table 2: Variance Partitioning (firm-financed / worker co-financed training)
Firm-financed Training Worker co-financed Training
Level Null Occ Null Occ
Establishment 11.2% 2.3% 10.8% 3.7%
Worker 23.4% 18.0% 34.8% 30.4%
Note: Table 2 reports the estimated intra-class correlation for different specifications of a
multilevel logit model for participation in job-related training courses either completely in
working hours of partly in leisure time (full estimation output is found in table 4 and table
5 in the Appendix). Standard errors are clustered on the establishment level. Establishment
and worker random effects are statistically significant in all specifications according to a
likelihood-ratio test.
To examine whether workers in establishments which provide a lot of training during working
hours also often co-finance training, we correlate the 149 establishment random effects of the
basic and the full model. The results indicate a small complementarity between both forms of
training on the establishment level before adding establishment, worker and job characteristics.
After conditioning on observable heterogeneity, this positive association becomes very small
and close to zero, indicating that worker and job heterogeneity contradict this picture.
relation drops to a meager 1.4%. However, the establishment random effects variation remains still significant
according to a likelihood-ratio test (as do worker random effects).
19Of course, the number of observations per establishment is much larger than this is the case for workers.
20Here, we only show the comparison between the basic and the full model. Results of the other specifications
can be supplied on request.
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4.2 Discussion
Theories on firm investments into the human capital of their workers, often rely on firm-level
monopsony power in order to explain firm heterogeneity. One of the main results of this paper is
that in comparison to worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity is far less important. This means
that differences between co-workers in a given firm have a much greater impact on determining
investments in training than aggregated differences between the workforce of two firms. We
will take a deeper look into worker and job heterogeneity below. As even firm variation is large,
let us discuss briefly how the variance of establishment random effects is reflected in average
training rates between establishments.21 The estimated training probability for the worker-firm
match in the basic model is 41%.22 This means that an establishment with an unobserved
random effect which is one standard deviation below the average has an unconditional train-
ing probability of just 26%.23 This difference is economically huge and considerable, as only
medium-sized firms with at least 100 employees are covered in the sample. We additionally find
that occupational differences as well as the sector, the economic performance and the amount
of wage compression within the firm are important drivers of the establishment heterogeneity.
While firms of the same sector, which are in a similar economic situation, do show similar
training rates, this does not hold for peers within the same establishment and job. In contrast
to the firm-level, most of the worker-level variance remains unexplained even after adding a
large set of control variables. The relevance of the variation in worker random effects can be
expressed with another simple statistical example. Let us take a look at 1,090 workers who
participate in all four waves of the survey.24 If we ignore the establishment dimension here,
we can expect slightly more than 9% of workers to never participate in training. If training
were to be randomly allocated, we could expect 4% of workers to participate in training in all
waves.25 The actual numbers are strikingly greater, 27% never participate in training during
the observation period, whilst 9% of workers participate in training in all four waves. Here
we see a much larger variation than we would have expected from a random allocation. This
exercise shows that inequality in training participation is also huge among workers even if they
are working in the same establishment. In line with the findings of Sousounis and Bladen Hovell
(2010) and Bassanini et al. (2005), we observe some workers participating on a regular basis
while more than a quarter are never participating in training. Hence, the persistence of training
21Random effects variance components are available in table 3 in the Appendix. One must bear in mind that
all variables, including binaries, are standardized such that we can read the estimated training probability for the
worker-firm match simply by considering the intercept (and of course, the logit link function).
22 1
1+exp(−0.38) ≈ 40.6%. The variance of establishment random effects is 0.65:σ2θ(1) = 0.65.
23 1
1+exp(−0.38−0.65) ≈ 26.3%
2418.8% of all survey participants.
25With a probability of 45%: (1− 0.45)4 ≈ 0.0915 and 0.454 ≈ 0.041.
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participation is also remarkably large here.
These results are not only found for job-related training in general but also hold if we distin-
guish between purely firm-financed and worker co-financed training. Unsurprisingly, worker
heterogeneity plays a more significant role in determining training investments where courses
are co-financed by workers. One might think that firms exploit the worker’s willingness to
personally invest into training by reducing their own investment. Though we do find some
complementarities between purely firm-financed and worker co-financed training at the firm
level, this relationship is not observed at the worker-level, i.e. we do not find evidence for a
substitution effect.26
We do not aim to discuss the importance of single characteristics here, but we should briefly
discuss the job heterogeneity w.r.t. occupations because it is the main source of observed in-
equalities. If we look at occupations, we find remarkable differences in participation in training
(see Figure 1). The reference occupations are other services which consist mostly of low-skilled
white-collar jobs such as security contractors and cleaners. We see that many occupations show
significantly higher training rates (only assembling and food processing jobs have actual in-
significantly lower participation rates) than other services. Training is particularly common in
certain female-dominated occupations such as health and education professions in which more
than two-thirds of all workers are female.27 In addition, rates of training are high amongst
engineers and electricians, as well as in certain white-collar jobs, including merchants, and in
a number of professions such as consultancy and accountancy. Training differences between
workers who perform certain tasks or work in certain occupations are significant, as illustrated
by the large (standardized) coefficients. In addition, we find large occupational differences be-
tween training in working hours and training overlapping into leisure time. Figure 1 shows, on
the one hand, that higher training rates in most occupations (compared to other services) are
driven by worker co-financed training. Only four occupational groups, engineers, merchants,
clerical professionals and teaching professions, are provided with significantly more training.
On the other hand, workers in many other jobs are trained more often in their leisure time. This
is particularly true for health-related professions.
5 Conclusion
A large amount of empirical literature addresses determinants and returns to training, but few
studies have looked simultaneously at multiple firms and their individual workers. The reason
for this is clear. Such an approach requires precise linked employer-employee data including
26Technically, we correlate the establishment random effects Corr
(
α
(1)
firm financed, α
(1)
worker co-financed
)
of equation (2)
in order to shed light on the relationship between aggregated firm- and worker co-financed training rates.
27For a comprehensive overview on gender differences in training participation see De Pinto et al. (2019).
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detailed training information on the individual level which has yet been barely available. The
lack of such empirical studies is clearly a shortcoming in this field as theory predicts that training
investment decisions of firms and workers are interlinked.
In this study we investigate the firm- and worker-level heterogeneity of training investments
made by firms and workers respectively. Using linked employer-employee data and multilevel
methods, we decompose variation in training participation into firm-level, worker-level and
random variation. We then use a huge set of predictors in order to further investigate how much
of the heterogeneity can be explained by observable characteristics. Since the job-level variation
is highly correlated with firm and worker heterogeneity, we capture this by including detailed
information on the occupation and the performed task structure.
5.1 Implications for Future Research
The contribution of this paper to the economic literature is threefold. First, we contribute to
the empirical literature on the returns to training. Unobserved heterogeneity is shown to be a
significant cause of differences between workers in terms of whether or not they participate in
training. This does not hold, however for establishment differences (or at least to a much lesser
extent). We therefore conclude that it is more important to address worker and job unobserved
heterogeneity than firm heterogeneity (if employer information is available) if one aims to es-
timate a causal effect. This implies for instance that worker selection has to be addressed if an
instrumental variable approach is planned to be applied.
Furthermore, and maybe more interesting, even though we can use a huge set of explanatory
variables we are not able to assign the majority of training differences to either firm- or worker-
level heterogeneity. A huge amount of investments seem to take place by chance. In future
research, potential sources should be detected. It is for instance likely, that workers participate
once in a decade in a training course but the timing of this event is completely random. With the
data at hand we would not observe such a frequency but with data covering a longer period, for
instance the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP), one could investigate such a relationship.
Our finding additionally implies the opportunity to find exogenous shocks which can be used to
find appropriate identification strategies. One example for such a strategy, is the cancelation of
training courses due to temporary sickness (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2008). Other exogenous
variations, which are due to the economic cycle or policy regulations, are also potential sources
for our findings.
Second, we add to the empirical literature on the determinants of training. It is shown that
the firm dimension, but particularly the job dimension, is important if we aim to explain firm
and worker heterogeneity. This finding is insofar important, as many previous studies which
analyzed the determinants of training did only include few information on job characteristics.
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Furthermore, we conclude that future research should focus to explain worker heterogeneity
because here, a large share of variation remains unexplained even though we include a huge set
of covariates. Essentially, researchers should aim to acquire better linked employer-employee
data which allow further examination of the assignment of job-related training to workers within
the same firm.
Third, we contribute indirectly to the theoretical literature on training investments. So far,
this literature is dominated by suggesting firm-level attributes to explain firm-sponsored invest-
ments. As we show here, this can be misleading as worker- and job-level variation seems to be
far more important. Several theories show that firms which are more successful in retaining their
workers are expected to invest more into (general) training. They give simple descriptions of
mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of workers leaving a position, for instance the monopsony
power of the firm (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998) or imperfect information on actual training
investments (Katz and Ziderman, 1990; Chang and Wang, 1996). Others assume complemen-
tarities between investments in technology and human capital (Acemoglu, 1997) which mean
that firms using different production processes and technologies invest to varying extents in
training. Our results support the requirement regarding theoretical considerations to move from
the firm-specific to a more job-specific perspective. We would therefore like to encourage the-
orists to further develop models which explicitly take job heterogeneity into account.
5.2 Policy Implications
This paper contains some policy implications regarding the often stressed goal of the EU and
industrialized nations to further foster life-long learning opportunities. Our results indicate
that inequalities of training participation among workers across and within firms exists. In the
explained part of the worker heterogeneity we see that investments in high-productive, high-
paid jobs are more likely compared to low productive jobs where often not even vocational
training is necessary. Among those who participate in training, a split into workers who benefit
from firm-sponsored training and those who partially pay themselves is common, even within
the same firm.
Obviously, the existence of inequalities in training participation does not necessarily indicate
that investments into training are too low for certain groups of workers. This conclusion would
require a further analyses of the optimal level of investment for each worker which is hardly
possible with real data (compare discussion in Bassanini et al. (2007)). It is nevertheless strik-
ing that occupations in the manufacturing and service sector, that are dominated by manual
tasks, show lower training participation rates. There is an obvious overlap of these occupations
and those that usually suffer more from layoffs during economic crisis, as well as from sub-
stitution as a result of technological changes. Many researchers and politicians call for more
12
qualifications for these groups of workers. We therefore conclude that our results at least raise
the question whether more work-related training during employment in these occupations could
lead to better future employment opportunities.
Even if it is not economically reasonable for a firm to invest in the human capital of certain
groups of workers, policy makers should bear these inequalities in mind. Especially, because
job-related training investments are accumulated over a life-cycle which leads to an increase
of inequalities over the lifetime and thus to a persistence of low skills. In their comprehensive
overview on workplace training in Europe, Bassanini et al. (2007) stated: "Apart from efficiency
arguments, equity considerations can be relevant to justify training for groups of workers in
disadvantaged economic conditions. If equity is interpreted as equality of opportunities - as
in Roemer, 1998, low participation in training activities by some disadvantaged categories of
workers may be not socially desirable, even if efficient. A key issue here is whether economic
policy should try to correct outcomes ...".
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Appendix
Table 3: Participation in Job-related Training Courses
Dependent Variable: Participation in Job-related Training Courses
Variable Null Model +Firm +Worker +Firm & +Firm &
Variables Variables Worker Var. Worker + Occ.
Year 2008 -0.15 (0.09) -0.14 (0.09) -0.13 (0.09) -0.13 (0.09) -0.13 (0.08)
Year 2009 -0.01 (0.08) -0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08) -0.02 (0.07)
Year 2010 -0.16** (0.07) -0.16** (0.07) -0.13* (0.07) -0.13* (0.07) -0.14** (0.06)
State Saxony 0.16 (0.12) 0.09 (0.11) 0.11 (0.09)
State Bavaria -0.01 (0.07) -0.01 (0.07) 0.03 (0.05)
State NRW -0.09 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) -0.02 (0.06)
State MV -0.06 (0.09) -0.1 (0.09) -0.02 (0.06)
Service Sector 0.32*** (0.06) 0.31*** (0.06) 0.09* (0.05)
Public Sector 0.23*** (0.08) 0.19** (0.07) 0.03 (0.06)
Employees 200-500 -0.05 (0.06) -0.05 (0.06) 0.00 (0.04)
Employees 500-2000 -0.06 (0.08) -0.07 (0.07) -0.04 (0.05)
Founded before 1975 -0.09 (0.08) -0.07 (0.08) 0.00 (0.06)
Founded after 1991 0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 0.03 (0.04)
Worker Council 0.00 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Median Wage 0.28*** (0.07) 0.2*** (0.06) 0.07* (0.04)
Median Wage Trend 0.22*** (0.05) 0.19*** (0.05) 0.14*** (0.03)
Wage Compression 0.21*** (0.07) 0.17** (0.07) 0.05 (0.06)
Women 0.00 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.07** (0.03)
Cohabiting 0.04* (0.03) 0.05* (0.03) 0.01 (0.02)
Tertiary Educ. 0.32*** (0.04) 0.31*** (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
No Voc. Qualification -0.16*** (0.03) -0.15*** (0.03) -0.06** (0.03)
Age -0.02 (0.23) 0.01 (0.23) 0.37 (0.24)
Age Sq. -0.27 (0.22) -0.29 (0.22) -0.59** (0.23)
Unempl. Exp. -0.09** (0.03) -0.08** (0.03) -0.06 (0.04)
Labor Attachment 0.09*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
Foreign Citizenship -0.05* (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02)
Health Status -0.09*** (0.03) -0.1*** (0.03) -0.06** (0.02)
Limited Contract -0.04 (0.03)
Managerial Resp. 0.15*** (0.03)
Part-Time -0.04 (0.03)
Tenure -0.2 (0.21)
Tenure Squared 0.1 (0.18)
Recently Hired 0.04 (0.04)
Constant -0.38*** (0.08) -0.25*** (0.06) -0.36*** (0.07) -0.26*** (0.05) -0.31*** (0.04)
Occupations No No No No Yes
Tasks No No No No Yes
σ2Firm 0.65 (0.10) 0.22 (0.06) 0.48 (0.08) 0.18 (0.05) 0.05 (0.02)
σ2Worker 1.5 (0.16) 1.5 (0.16) 1.29 (0.14) 1.3 (0.14) 0.79 (0.1)
N 12560 12560 12560 12560 12560
Wald χ2 207 358 606 743 2141
Log Likelihood -8058 -8006 -7898 -7852 -7453
Note: Own calculations; Multilevel logit estimation; cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses (on the firm-level); Mandatory-job
training courses are excluded. Regression includes a variables capturing the number of months a worker has been asked retrospectively.
Significance levels: ∗= significant at 10%-level, ∗∗= significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗= significant at 1%-level
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Table 4: Participation in Training Courses during Working Hours
Dependent Variable: Participation in Job-related Training Courses during Working Hours
Variable Null Model +Firm +Worker +Firm & +Firm &
Variables Variables Worker Var. Worker + Occ.
Year 2008 -0.1 (0.08) -0.1 (0.08) -0.09 (0.08) -0.09 (0.08) -0.1 (0.08)
Year 2009 0.04 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08) 0.06 (0.07) 0.06 (0.08) 0.03 (0.07)
Year 2010 -0.05 (0.06) -0.05 (0.06) -0.03 (0.06) -0.03 (0.06) -0.05 (0.06)
State Saxony 0.34** (0.13) 0.27** (0.13) 0.23** (0.11)
State Bavaria 0.1 (0.09) 0.08 (0.09) 0.13* (0.07)
State NRW -0.05 (0.11) -0.03 (0.10) 0.00 (0.08)
State MV 0.06 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.04 (0.07)
Service Sector 0.14** (0.07) 0.15** (0.06) 0.07 (0.06)
Public Sector 0.11 (0.08) 0.1 (0.08) 0.00 (0.07)
Employees 200-500 -0.01 (0.06) 0.00 (0.06) 0.05 (0.05)
Employees 500-2000 -0.02 (0.08) -0.04 (0.07) -0.01 (0.05)
Founded before 1975 0.00 (0.09) 0.02 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08)
Founded 1976-1991 0.03 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) 0.04 (0.05)
Worker Council 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Median Wage 0.41*** (0.07) 0.33*** (0.07) 0.2*** (0.06)
Median Wage Trend 0.2*** (0.06) 0.18*** (0.06) 0.14*** (0.05)
Wage Compression 0.25*** (0.06) 0.22*** (0.06) 0.13*** (0.05)
Women -0.08** (0.03) -0.09*** (0.03) -0.09*** (0.03)
Cohabiting 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Tertiary Educ. 0.22*** (0.04) 0.21*** (0.04) 0.00 (0.04)
No Voc. Qualification -0.14*** (0.04) -0.13*** (0.04) -0.06 (0.04)
Age -0.42* (0.22) -0.38* (0.22) -0.19 (0.21)
Age Sq. 0.21 (0.21) 0.18 (0.21) 0.00 (0.21)
Unempl. Exp. -0.1*** (0.03) -0.08** (0.03) -0.03 (0.04)
Labor Attachment 0.08*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Foreign Citizenship -0.06* (0.03) -0.05* (0.03) -0.04 (0.03)
Health Status -0.09*** (0.03) -0.1*** (0.03) -0.06** (0.02)
Limited Contract -0.09*** (0.03)
Managerial Resp. 0.13*** (0.03)
Part-Time -0.12*** (0.04)
Tenure -0.22 (0.21)
Tenure Squared 0.19 (0.18)
Recently Hired 0.02 (0.04)
Constant -1.26*** (0.08) -1.11*** (0.06) -1.24*** (0.08) -1.12*** (0.05) -1.14*** (0.05)
Occupations No No No No Yes
Tasks No No No No Yes
σ2Firm 0.56 (0.10) 0.22 (0.05) 0.46 (0.09) 0.19 (0.05) 0.09 (0.03)
σ2Worker 1.18 (0.13) 1.18 (0.13) 1.06 (0.12) 1.06 (0.12) 0.74 (0.09)
N 12560 12560 12560 12560 12560
Wald χ2 73 181 264 397 1642
Log Likelihood -7262 -7216 -7164 -7123 -6877
Note: Own calculations; Multilevel logit estimation; cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses (on the firm-level); Mandatory-job
training courses are excluded. Regression includes a variable capturing the number of months a worker has been asked retrospectively.
Significance levels: ∗= significant at 10%-level, ∗∗= significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗= significant at 1%-level
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Table 5: Participation in Training Courses Overlapping into Leisure Time
Dependent Variable: Participation in Job-related Training Courses at least partly in Leisure Time
Variable Null Model +Firm +Worker +Firm & +Firm &
Variables Variables Worker Var. Worker + Occ.
Year 2008 -0.17* (0.09) -0.17* (0.09) -0.16* (0.09) -0.16 (0.09) -0.16* (0.09)
Year 2009 -0.13 (0.08) -0.13 (0.08) -0.11 (0.08) -0.11 (0.08) -0.14 (0.08)
Year 2010 -0.26*** (0.07) -0.26*** (0.07) -0.22*** (0.07) -0.22*** (0.07) -0.22*** (0.07)
State Saxony -0.07 (0.16) -0.11 (0.15) -0.05 (0.14)
State Bavaria -0.08 (0.10) -0.07 (0.10) -0.09 (0.09)
State NRW -0.04 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.11)
State MV -0.11 (0.13) -0.13 (0.12) -0.05 (0.11)
Service Sector 0.36*** (0.07) 0.29*** (0.07) 0.03 (0.07)
Public Sector 0.18* (0.10) 0.13 (0.09) 0.04 (0.07)
Employees 200-500 -0.08 (0.07) -0.08 (0.06) -0.08 (0.06)
Employees 500-2000 -0.08 (0.09) -0.09 (0.09) -0.06 (0.07)
Founded before 1975 -0.18 (0.12) -0.16 (0.12) -0.07 (0.11)
Founded 1976-1991 -0.04 (0.08) -0.03 (0.07) -0.01 (0.06)
Worker Council 0.00 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05) 0.06 (0.04)
Median Wage -0.05 (0.10) -0.09 (0.09) -0.15* (0.08)
Median Wage Trend 0.13** (0.07) 0.11* (0.06) 0.07 (0.06)
Wage Compression 0.13 (0.08) 0.07 (0.08) -0.02 (0.07)
Women 0.21*** (0.05) 0.17*** (0.05) 0.08* (0.04)
Cohabiting 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04)
Tertiary Educ. 0.28*** (0.04) 0.28*** (0.04) 0.07* (0.04)
No Voc. Qualification -0.18*** (0.05) -0.18*** (0.05) -0.08* (0.04)
Age 0.58** (0.28) 0.59** (0.28) 0.87*** (0.31)
Age Sq. -0.85*** (0.28) -0.86*** (0.28) -1.06*** (0.30)
Unempl. Exp. -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04)
Labor Attachment 0.09*** (0.03) 0.09** (0.04) 0.04 (0.03)
Foreign Citizenship -0.02 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03)
Health Status -0.05* (0.03) -0.05* (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
Limited Contract 0.05 (0.03)
Managerial Resp. 0.08** (0.04)
Part-Time 0.09** (0.04)
Tenure 0.11 (0.21)
Tenure Squared -0.19 (0.20)
Recently Hired 0.1** (0.04)
Constant -2.02*** (0.10) -1.97*** (0.10) -2*** (0.09) -1.99*** (0.09) -2.02*** (0.08)
Occupations No No No No Yes
Tasks No No No No Yes
σ2Firm 0.66 (0.11) 0.4 (0.09) 0.47 (0.09) 0.34 (0.08) 0.18 (0.06)
σ2Worker 2.1 (0.24) 2.1 (0.24) 1.92 (0.22) 1.91 (0.22) 1.52 (0.19)
N 12560 12560 12560 12560 12560
Wald χ2 149 240 394 491 1185
Log Likelihood -5849 -5825 -5747 -5731 -5538
Note: Own calculations; Multilevel logit estimation; cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses (on the firm-level); Mandatory-job
training courses are excluded. Regression includes a variables capturing the number of months a worker has been asked retrospectively.
Significance levels: ∗= significant at 10%-level, ∗∗= significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗= significant at 1%-level
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